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STRATEGIC MANIPULABILITY OF SELF-SELECTIVE
SOCIAL CHOICE RULES
Mostapha Diss∗
This version, December 2012
ABSTRACT: We provide exact relations giving the probability of individual and coalitional
manipulation of three specific social choice functions (Borda rule, Copeland rule, Plurality rule)
in three-alternative elections when the notion of self-selectivity is imposed. The results suggest
that the Borda rule is more vulnerable to coalitional manipulation than the Copeland rule and the
Plurality rule. However, Plurality rule seems to be more vulnerable to individual manipulability
when the number of voters is greater than a certain threshold value. In addition, the probability
of individual and coalitional manipulation tends to vanish significantly when the notion of self-
selectivity is imposed.
KEYWORDS: Voting rules, Self-selectivity, Stability, Manipulability, Probability.
JEL CLASSIFICATION: D72
1 Introduction
Voting rules aggregating individual preferences into a collective choice differ in their vulnerability
to manipulation. Manipulating an election is for voters (individual voter or a coalition of voters)
a way to announce non sincere individual preferences in order to achieve better voting result for
themselves. We know from the well-known theorem of Gibbard-Satterthwaite [12, 29] that all
voting rules, when choosing a single candidate for at least three candidates and without a dictator,
are vulnerable to this type of strategic behavior. These studies have given rise to a number of
extensions and generalizations of Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem.
Many papers dealing with the probability of different voting rules to be manipulable under
various definitions of manipulability was presented in the literature. This framework stipulates to
introduce a certain measure of manipulability of a voting rule and a certain assumptions on the
distribution of voter preferences. These manipulability measures were first introduced by Nitzan
[28] for the case of individual manipulation and Lepelley and Mbih [23] for the case of coalitional
manipulation. Other interesting manipulability measures were also presented by Aleskerov and
Kurbanov [1], Kelly [17, 18] and Smith [31].
The question of the probability of manipulability was widely investigated by Favardin et
al. [9], Lepelley and Mbih [24, 25], Favardin and Lepelley [8], Lepelley and Valognes [26]
and Gehrlein and Lepelley [11]. The mean idea of these papers is to evaluate the proportion
of preference profiles or voting situations that are not equilibria, that is the voting situations at
which the voting rule taken into consideration is manipulable by an individual or a coalition of
individuals. So, the vulnerability to individual or coalitional manipulability is used in order to
∗Universite´ de Lyon, Lyon, F-69007, France ; CNRS, GATE Lyon Saint-Etienne, Ecully, F-69130, France ;
Universite´ Jean Monnet, Saint-Etienne, F-42000, France. Tel.: + 33 (0)4 77 42 19 60. Email: diss@gate.cnrs.fr.
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compare voting rules according to their sensitivity. However, no paper has tried to evaluate the
probability of strategic manipulability of a self-selective voting rule.
Self-selectivity is a new principle introduced in the social choice literature. It is a desirable
property of voting rules considered when individuals have to choose a voting rule in a set of voting
rules. A voting rule is self-selective at some profile if, given this profile, there is no alternative
rule that beats the given voting rule if the given voting rule is used to choose between the rules
in the set. If a rule, which is not self-selective is used, then there will be a large enough group of
voters who all prefer another voting rule to be successful in changing the rule. The notion of self-
selectivity gives rise to another original concept when the given set of voting rules is considered.
A set of voting rules is (weakly) stable if it always contains at least one self-selective rule at any
profile or voting situation. In this case, if none of the voting rules in the set is self selective, the
society could never be able to vote how to vote. These questions were first considered by Koray
[19], Koray and Unel [20], Barbera` and Jackson [3], Barbera` and Bevia` [2] and Houy [14, 15, 16].
Considering some probabilistic models, these questions were also investigated by Diss and Merlin
[5] and Diss et al. [4].
The concepts of individual and coalitional manipulation can be extended quite naturally to the
notion of self-selective voting rules. The vote will be on voting rules and, as in the basic framework
of manipulation, it can be profitable for some voter at some voting situation to misrepresent his
preferences on voting rules in order to have an outcome (voting rule) preferred to that resulting in
the voting situation in which his vote reflects his true preferences. As a consequence, manipulating
a self-selective voting rule means that this rule becomes not-selective after manipulation. This
situation can lead to a serious paradox of instability if all the other considered voting rules are
not self-selective after manipulation. This is equivalent to a situation in which it is impossible
to directly or indirectly reach a self-selective voting rule if implementing any voting rule of
the considered set. This problem can be solved by considering self-selectivity before and after
manipulation. That is, when we consider the manipulation of a self-selective voting rule, the
considered set of voting rules must contain at least one self-selective voting rule after manipulation.
In other words, the set of voting rules must be stable after manipulation.
We reconsider in this paper the question of the probability of both individual and coalitional
manipulability for three most commonly used voting rules in the literature: Borda rule, Copeland
rule and Plurality rule. The main idea will be first to characterize the voting situations at which
each voting rule is self-selective and vulnerable to manipulation by an individual or a coalition
of individuals given that the set of the considered voting rules remains stable after manipulation.
Secondly, the probabilities of the vulnerability are found using the Impartial and Anonymous
Culture (IAC) assumption and the three voting rules Borda, Copeland and Plurality are compared
taking into consideration these probabilities. The route followed in this paper concerns the impact
of the self-selectivity and stability assumptions on the probability of vulnerability of each voting
rule to both individual and coalitional manipulation.
The paper is organized as follows. The basic notions and assumptions used throughout this
paper are introduced in section 2. For the Borda rule, the Copeland method and the Plurality
rule, we analyze manipulation by a single voter in section 3 and section 4 is devoted to coalitional
manipulation. Finally, section 5 presents our conclusions.
2 Basic framework and definitions
Consider n voters, with cardinality n ≥ 2, showing their true preferences on the set X composed
by Copeland method (Cop), Borda rule (Bor) and Plurality rule (Plu). Without ties, the six possible
preference orderings over this set will be numbered in Table 1. This Table means that, for instance,
n1 individuals prefer Borda to Copeland, which is preferred to Plurality. A preference profile
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Table 1: The 6 preference rankings for 3 voting rules
Bor  Cop  Plu n1 Cop  Plu  Bor n4
Bor  Plu  Cop n2 Plu  Bor  Cop n5
Cop  Bor  Plu n3 Plu  Cop  Bor n6
is defined as a matrix consisting of n vectors that represent voters’ preferences by ordering the
three alternatives (voting rules). A vector n˜ = (n1, n2, n3, n4, n5, n6) such that
∑
i ni = n
defines a voting situation. The set of possible voting situations with size n is then: Dn = {n˜ =
(n1, ..., n6),
∑6
i=1 ni = n, ni ≥ 0}. Consequently, we will define the voting rules on D =
∪∞n=1Dn which will be a mapping from D into 2X \ ∅. In this paper, we assume that a voting rule
is a social choice correspondence, that is, it associates to each voting situation at least one winning
alternative (voting rule) in X . It means that each voting rule assigns to each voting situation a
nonempty subset of X . Also, we shall assume that the collective decision for each voting situation
only depends upon the restriction of the individual preferences.
We now introduce the voting rules used throughout this paper. If one candidate defeats all
others head-to-head, that candidate is said to be the Condorcet winner. Of course, a candidate is
a Condorcet loser if she loses all pairwise comparisons. For example, Bor is a Condorcet winner
if and only if Bor wins against both Cop (i.e. n1 + n2 − n3 − n4 + n5 − n6 > 0) and Plu (i.e.
n1 + n2 + n3 − n4 − n5 − n6 > 0). In rare occasions, each candidate is defeated by at least
one other, so there is no Condorcet winner. One solution to such a paradox will be the Copeland
method which generalizes the notion of pairwise majority rule, to suggest that the election winner
should be the candidate that defeats the most other candidates by majority rule under pairwise
comparison. For each pair of alternatives a and b, let Na,b be the number of voter who prefer
alternative a to alternative b . In addition, let Ta,b be the following function such that:
Ta,b = =
{
1, if Na,b > n2
0, if not
(1)
Ta,b = 1 means that a majority of voters prefers alternative a to alternative b. With this definition,
one obtains the Copeland score of an alternative awhich is equal to the number of other alternatives
that a beats. This is equivalent to the following score:
Copeland Score (a) =
∑
b∈X
Ta,b (2)
where X is the set of the available alternatives. Consequently, for each alternative a, the possible
values of Copeland score ranges from 0 if a is a Condorcet loser to m − 1 if a is a Condorcet
winner. In other words, a Copeland winner is an alternative with maximal Copeland score and
if there exists a Condorcet winner, this alternative is the unique Copeland winner. Notice that, in
three candidate elections, the unique winner by Copeland rule must be the strict Condorcet winner,
i.e. an alternative which has a strict majority against every other alternative. In addition, there
must be a pairwise majority rule cycle if there is not a unique Copeland rule winner with an odd
number of voters. That is, in some cases, it is necessary to use some tie-breaking procedure. The
lexicographic order is the well-known example to break ties between two (or more) candidates.
This assumption will be used throughout this paper.
Borda and Plurality rules belong to the well-known Weighted Scoring rules (or, simply, scoring
rules) which can be defined as follows: each voter’s ballot must be a vector that gives the number
of points that the voter assigns to each candidate according to his or her position in the voter’s
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preference. The vote vectors of all voters are summed and the winning candidate has the highest
number of points. In a three-candidate election, each scoring rule can be defined by a vector
(2, 1 + λ, 0), where −1 ≤ λ ≤ 1. It means that each individual assigns 2, 1 + λ and 0 points
respectively to each first, second and third placed candidate in this individual preference rankings.
In this case, Borda rule and Plurality rule will be defined for λ = 0 and λ = −1, respectively.
Notice that , other classifications are possible in the sense that a linear transformation of a scoring
rule does not change the outcome of the election.
The strategic manipulation of each self-selective voting rule in the set X is the focus of our
results in this paper. We use throughout this paper the definition given by Houy [14, 15, 16].
Definition 1 Consider a set of voting rules X , and consider a given preference profile or voting
situation on the available voting rules in X . A voting rule in X is said to be self-selective if it
chooses itself when it is used to decide between voting rules in X .
To illustrate this notion, let us consider an example of coalitional manipulation. Consider a society
of 21 voters who have to choose a voting rule in the set X = {Bor, P lu, Cop}. The individual
preferences are given in Table 2. For this example, Borda and Plurality rules are self-selective
in the sense that the application of Borda gives out Borda as a result (the Borda scores of Borda,
Copeland and Plurality respectively are 30, 13 and 20) and the application of Plurality rule gives
out itself (the Plurality scores of Borda, Copeland and Plurality respectively are 18, 4 and 20).
In addition, Copeland is not self-selective since the application of Copeland method gives out
Borda (the Copeland scores of Borda, Copeland and Plurality respectively are 2, 1 and 0). In this
Table 2: Self-selectivity and coalitional manipulation
Preference order Number of voters
Plu  Bor  Cop 10
Bor  Cop  Plu 9
Cop  Bor  Plu 2
example, two voters (with preference Cop  Bor  Plu) are manipulating. In a sincere election,
this type voters cast their votes for Copeland, but Plurality wins when we use Plurality. If this type
voters anticipate this result, they can vote for Borda instead of Copeland; that is, they can vote with
the preference Bor  Cop  Plu. By voting with this preference, they guarantee that Borda,
whom they prefer to Plurality, is elected.
Notice that the manipulation of each voting rule will lead to the fact that the considered voting
rule becomes not self-selective after manipulation. For the modified example, Plurality rule is
not self-selective since Plurality selects Borda rule (the Plurality scores of Borda, Copeland and
Plurality respectively are 22, 0 and 20). Moreover, Borda remains self-selective since Borda rule
selects itself (the Borda scores of Borda, Copeland and Plurality respectively are 32, 11 and 20).
In addition, Copeland method remains not self-selective as Copeland is still selecting Borda (the
Copeland scores of Borda, Copeland and Plurality remains respectively 2, 1 and 0). As said above,
the notion of self-selectivity of voting rules is important for each society and still important after
the manipulation. Indeed, this notion becomes fully operational only if there exists at least one self-
selective rule at each profile. Since no voting rule remains self-selective after its manipulation, our
objective will be to guarantee that each society must have a self-selective voting rule included in the
set of voting rulesX with the new preferences of individuals if they misrepresent their preferences
to manipulate. That is, in order to guarantee that the process of establishment of the rules remains
in stable stage, the set of voting rules X must be (weakly) stable. This is a meaningful condition
on the set of valid voting rules which can be defined as follows (Houy [14, 15, 16]):
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Definition 2 Consider a set of voting rules X , and consider a given preference profile on the
available voting rules in X . The set X is (weakly) stable if, at any profile, there exists at least one
self-selective voting rule.
Of course, the set X is unstable if, at any profile, there does not exist a self-selective voting
rule in X . For preferences in Table 2, the manipulation of Plurality leads to the fact that this
rule becomes not self-selective and gives out Borda rule which remains self-selective with the
new preferences. That is, manipulation can be considered in this paper since it does not lead to
temporary problems of instability. In this case, frequent manipulation cause that the general idea of
a unique self-selective rule fails, nevertheless the social decision remains predictable in the sense
that a self-selective rule will emerge.
The impact of both self-selectivity and stability on the probability of manipulation of each
voting rule in the set X will be our objective. In other words, the aim of this paper will be to
reconsider the probability of strategic manipulation of each voting rule in the set X when the
considered voting rule is self-selective and when the set X contains at least one self-selective
voting rule after manipulation. This probability depends on the hypothesis that are set upon the
behavior of the voters. Two models were widely studied in the literature: Impartial Culture (IC)
and Impartial and Anonymous Culture (IAC). The main idea is the notion of equiprobability of
profiles for IC and voting situations for IAC. In other words, Impartial Culture [10, 13] model
assumes that each voter selects his preferences out of possible linear orders and each of preference
profiles is equally likely. For the case of m alternatives, the total number of different preference
profiles is (m!)n and this model assumes that each of the (m!)n preference profiles is equally likely.
In this paper, we will consider the IAC model which assumes that each voting situation has the
same probability to occur. For n agents and m alternatives, the total number of voting situations
is Cnn+m!−1. For a specified n in the case of 3 alternatives and using a simple calculation, the total
number of voting situations is given by the fifth-degree polynomial ψ(n) and therefore each voting
situation n˜ = (n1, n2, n3, n4, n5, n6) will have the same probability to occur 1ψ(n) .
ψ(n) =
(n+ 5)!
n! 5!
=
1
120
n5 +
1
8
n4 +
17
24
n3 +
15
8
n2 +
137
60
n+ 1 (3)
3 Self-selectivity and strategic individual manipulation
Recall that, given a voting situation n˜ = (n1, n2, n3, n4, n5, n6), a voting rule is individually
manipulable at n˜ if there exists a voter who, can benefit from a misrepresentation of her or his
preference. We consider throughout this paper that the number of voters n is supposed to be
odd. This assumption is used in order to simplify the expression of some results of the paper.
The propositions and numerical values for an even number of voters are obtained using the same
techniques and are available upon request from the author. Notice that the conclusions obtained
for an odd number of voters can be extended quite naturally to an even number of voters. Now,
we can characterize all voting situations at which a self-selective Copeland rule is individually
manipulable given that the set X will contain at least one self-selective rule after manipulation.
The same characterization is given for both Borda rule and Plurality rule. Cop(X, n˜), Bor(X, n˜)
and Plu(X, n˜) will denote respectively the Copeland winner, the Borda winner and the Plurality
winner when the voting situation is n˜ and the set of available voting rules is X .
Lemma 1 Consider the voting situation n˜ = (n1, n2, n3, n4, n5, n6) and the set of available
voting rules X = {Bor,Cop, P lu}. The Copeland rule is self-selective, individually manipulable
at n˜ with guaranteed stability of X if and only if the following conditions are satisfied:
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(i) −n1−n2+n3+n4−n5+n6 > 0 and n1+n2+n3−n4−n5−n6 ≥ 1 and n1−n2+n3+
n4−n5−n6 = 1 and n1 ≥ 1 and [−n1−n2+n5+n6 > 0 and−n3−n4+n5+n6 > 0];
or
(ii) −n1 − n2 + n3 + n4 − n5 + n6 > 0 and n1 + n2 + n3 − n4 − n5 − n6 ≥ 1 and n1 −
n2 + n3 + n4 − n5 − n6 = 1 and n1 ≥ 1 and [2n1 + n2 + n3 − n4 − n5 − 2n6 > 1 and
n1 + 2n2 − n3 − 2n4 + n5 − n6 > −1].
Proof. Notice that the first part outside the bracketed list in (i) and (ii) can be considered as a
particular case of Lemma 1 in Favardin et al. [9]. Consider first the situation corresponding to self-
selectivity before manipulation. The Copeland rule is self-selective if and only if Cop(X, n˜) =
Cop. Thus, we must have n3 + n4 + n6 > n1 + n2 + n5 and n1 + n3 + n4 > n2 + n5 + n6.
This is equivalent to the fact that Cop is a Condorcet winner. In such a situation, no individual
manipulation in favor of Plu can occur because a supporter of Plu cannot make Plu beat Cop
in pairwise comparison. However, a supporter of Bor can make Bor the Copeland winner by
modifying the majority relation between Cop and Plu rules (n1 ≥ 1) in order to obtain a cycle
and then breaking this cycle in favor of Bor instead of Cop. This strategy will have as a result the
election ofBor if and only ifBor is preferred to Plu (this is equivalent to n1+n2+n3−n4−n5−
n6 ≥ 1) andCop is preferred to Plu by one vote (this is equivalent to n1−n2+n3+n4−n5−n6 =
1). Nevertheless, given that the condition n1 − n2 + n3 + n4 − n5 − n6 = 1 is included in the
condition n1+n3+n4 > n2+n5+n6, we will only keep the first one. In addition, we need that the
set has at least one self-selective voting rule when the individual voter manipulates. This implies
that Borda or Plurality need to be self-selective. It is equivalent to the part inside the bracketed list
of each point of the Lemma. We know that an individual with preferences Bor  Cop  Plu can
manipulate the election by voting Bor  Plu  Cop. When this individual misrepresents her
preferences, the new voting situation becomes n˜ = (n1−1, n2+1, n3, n4, n5, n6) and the Plurality
rule is self-selective if and only if−n1−n2+n5+n6 > 0 and−n3−n4+n5+n6 > 0. This proves
the necessity of (i). When Borda rule is self-selective, this implies 2n1+n2+n3−n4−n5−2n6 > 1
and n1 + 2n2 − n3 − 2n4 + n5 − n6 > −1. This proves the necessity of (ii). 
Now, we give the exact formulas of the probability of vulnerability of Copeland rule to individual
manipulation when this rule is self-selective and the set of available voting rules X remains stable
after manipulation.
Proposition 1 Consider the voting situation n˜ = (n1, n2, n3, n4, n5, n6) with n odd and the set of
available voting rules X = {Bor,Cop, P lu}. Consider that Copeland rule is self-selective and
that the set X contains at least one self-selective voting rule after manipulation. The probability
of vulnerability of Copeland rule to individual manipulation for n ≥ 13 is given by:
• 5288
(n−1)(9n3+77n2+83n−457)
(n+1)(n+2)(n+3)(n+4)(n+5) for n = 1 mod 12
• 5288
(n−3)(9n3+95n2+291n+333)
(n+1)(n+2)(n+3)(n+4)(n+5) for n = 3 mod 12
• 5288
(n+7)(9n3+5n2−77n−289)
(n+1)(n+2)(n+3)(n+4)(n+5) for n = 5 mod 12
• 5288
(n+5)(9n2−22n+1)
(n+4)(n+3)(n+2)(n+1) for n = 7 mod 12
• 5288 9n
3+41n2−117n−189
(n+5)(n+4)(n+2)(n+1) for n = 9 mod 12
• 5288 9n
3+59n2−101n−727
(n+5)(n+4)(n+3)(n+2) for n = 11 mod 12
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Proof. In this paper, the proof of each proposition can be formulated as counting the exact number
of integer solutions in the finite systems of linear constraints with rational coefficients in each
corresponding Lemma. As recently pointed out by Lepelley et al. [22] and Wilson and Pritchard
[33], the appropriate mathematical concepts to study such problems are polytopes and Ehrhart
polynomials [6, 7]. These concepts were also used by the author in Diss et al. [4]. Using
Parameterized Barvinok’s algorithm (Verdoolaege et al. [32]), under the condition
∑6
i=1 ni = n
and ni ≥ 0, the number of integer points inside system (i) in Lemma 1 is given by the Ehrhart
polynomial Y (n) for n ≥ 7 as:
Y (n) =
5
10368
n4 +
1
324
n3 + [0,
−1
576
, 0,
−1
576
, 0,
−19
1728
]nn2 + [0,
−7
324
, 0,
−1
36
, 0,
−23
324
]nn
+[0,
205
10368
, 0,
−3
128
, 0,
−595
10368
]n
The bracketed list [0, −1576 , 0,
−1
576 , 0,
−19
1728 ]n is a periodic number with period 6 which depends on
the value of n. It is equivalent to −1576 if n = 1 mod 6 or n = 3 mod 6, and
−19
1728 if n = 5 mod 6. It
is also equal to 0 in the other cases. In addition, the number of integer points inside system (ii) in
Lemma 1 is given by the Ehrhart polynomial Z(n) for n ≥ 5 as:
Z(n) =
1
1152
n4 +
1
144
n3 +
−1
576
n2 +
−1
16
n+ [0,
65
1152
, 0,
−7
128
, 0,
−7
128
]n
Recall that we need to find the number of integer points in the intersection of events (i) and (ii)
and to subtract it from Y (n) + Z(n). This number is given by the Ehrhart polynomial I(n) for
n ≥ 13 as:
I(n) =
1
20736
n4 +
1
5184
n3 + [0,
−5
1152
, 0,
−5
1152
, 0,
−23
3456
]nn2 + [0,
−31
5184
, 0,
−7
576
, 0,
−71
5184
]nn
+[0,
209
20736
, 0,
17
256
, 0,
3745
20736
, 0,
1505
20736
, 0,
1
256
, 0,
−143
20736
]n
As a consequence, for n ≥ 13, the cardinality of (i) and (ii) is given by Y (n) + Z(n) − I(n)
which will be divided by the total number of situations ψ(n) in order to find the probability of
vulnerability of Copeland rule to individual manipulation as a function of n. This proves the
proposition 1. The corresponding probabilities are given in Table 3. Notice that for the case n = 5
the probability of vulnerability of Copeland rule to individual manipulation is given by Z(n)ψ(n) . In
addition for 7 ≤ n < 13, this probability is given by Y (n)+Z(n)ψ(n) in the sense that the intersection
between (i) and (ii) is empty when n < 13. 
The same characterization can be found for Borda rule. LetB(j) andB′(j) be the Borda score
of alternative j ∈ X before and after manipulation, respectively.
Lemma 2 Consider the voting situation n˜ = (n1, n2, n3, n4, n5, n6) and the set of available
voting rules X = {Bor,Cop, P lu}. The Borda rule is self-selective, individually manipulable at
n˜ with guaranteed stability of X if and only if the following conditions are satisfied:
(i) B(Bor) = B(Cop) and B(Bor) ≥ B(Plu) and n6 ≥ 1 and [(B′(Plu) > B′(Bor) and
B′(Plu) > B′(Cop)) or (B′(Cop) > B′(Bor) and B′(Cop) > B′(Plu))]; or
(ii) B(Bor) = B(Cop) and B(Bor) ≥ B(Plu) and B(Cop) ≥ B(Plu) + 1 and n3 ≥ 1
and [(B′(Plu) > B′(Bor) and B′(Plu) > B′(Cop)) or (B′(Cop) > B′(Bor) and
B′(Cop) > B′(Plu))]; or
(iii) B(Bor) = B(Plu) and B(Bor) ≥ B(Cop) and n4 ≥ 1 and [(B′(Plu) > B′(Bor) and
B′(Plu) > B′(Cop)) or (B′(Cop) > B′(Bor) and B′(Cop) > B′(Plu))]; or
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(iv) B(Bor) = B(Plu) and B(Bor) ≥ B(Cop) and B(Plu) ≥ B(Cop) + 1 and n5 ≥ 1
and [(B′(Plu) > B′(Bor) and B′(Plu) > B′(Cop)) or (B′(Cop) > B′(Bor) and
B′(Cop) > B′(Plu))].
Proof. Notice that the first part outside the bracketed list in (i), (ii), (iii) and (iv) can be considered
as a particular case of Lemma 2 in Favardin et al. [9]. Under the first part of condition (i), we can
easily check that a voter with preferences Plu  Cop  Bor (n6 ≥ 1) can give Cop  Plu 
Bor. This strategy increases B(Cop) by one point and decreases B(Plu) by one point. B(Bor)
remains the same since the position of Bor does not change. As a consequence, if B(Bor) =
B(Cop) and B(Bor) ≥ B(Plu) and n6 ≥ 1, the winner will be Cop and Borda rule becomes
manipulable. In addition, as said before, the manipulation of Borda will lead to the new voting
situation (n1, n2, n3, n4 + 1, n5, n6 − 1). In this case, Plurality is self-selective if and only if
B′(Plu) > B′(Bor) and B′(Plu) > B′(Cop). In addition, Copeland is self-selective if and
only if B′(Cop) > B′(Bor) and B′(Cop) > B′(Plu). This proves the necessity of (i). Now,
the voter with the preference Cop  Bor  Plu can also manipulate if Borda is self-selective.
This voter can have the preference Cop  Plu  Bor. That is, B(Bor) decreases by one point,
B(Plu) increases by one point and B(Cop) remains the same. Then, if B(Bor) = B(Cop) and
B(Bor) ≥ B(Plu) and B(Cop) ≥ B(Plu) + 1 and n3 ≥ 1, manipulation leads to the fact that
Cop becomes the winner. This proves the necessity of (ii). Similarly, we can easily find conditions
(iii) and (iv) by assuming that the Borda rule is manipulable in favor of Plurality rule. 
The reader will easily check that, for example, under condition (i), B(Bor) = B(Cop) and
B(Bor) ≥ B(Plu) correspond to 2n1 + 2n2 + n3 + n5 = 2n3 + 2n4 + n1 + n6 and 2n1 +
2n2+n3+n5 ≥ 2n5+2n6+n4+n2, respectively. In addition, after the manipulation, Plurality
is self-selective if and only if −n3 − n4 + n5 + n6 > 2 and −n1 − n2 + n5 + n6 > 1. In
addition, Copeland is self-selective if and only if −n1 − n2 + n3 + n4 − n5 + n6 > 0 and
n1 − n2 + n3 + n4 − n5 − n6 > −2. It defines the system of (in)equalities in the condition (i).
We can easily find the remaining (in)equalities for each point of Lemma which are available upon
request from the author. Now, we give the exact formulas of the probability of vulnerability of
Borda rule to individual manipulation in our framework.
Proposition 2 Consider the voting situation n˜ = (n1, n2, n3, n4, n5, n6) with n odd and the set
of available voting rules X = {Bor,Cop, P lu}. Consider that Borda rule is self-selective and
that the set X contains at least one self-selective voting rule after manipulation. The probability
of vulnerability of Borda rule to individual manipulation for n ≥ 10 is given by:
• 5864 55n
4+868n3+4266n2−19420n+159383
(n+1)(n+2)(n+3)(n+4)(n+5) for n = 1 mod 12
• 5864 55n
4+868n3+4266n2−18396n+175527
(n+1)(n+2)(n+3)(n+4)(n+5) for n = 3 mod 12
• 5864 55n
4+868n3+3930n2−16124n+171271
(n+1)(n+2)(n+3)(n+4)(n+5) for n = 5 mod 12
• 5864 55n
4+868n3+4266n2−19420n+160679
(n+1)(n+2)(n+3)(n+4)(n+5) for n = 7 mod 12
• 5864 55n
4+868n3+4266n2−18396n+174231
(n+1)(n+2)(n+3)(n+4)(n+5) for n = 9 mod 12
• 5864 55n
4+868n3+3930n2−16124n+167383
(n+1)(n+2)(n+3)(n+4)(n+5) for n = 11 mod 12
The reader will easily check that the first case in both (iii) and (iv) are impossible. It is also
possible to check that other cases are similar and will give the same Ehrhart polynomial. The
proof is similar to the corresponding one of Copeland rule. However, there are 6 possible cases in
this Lemma. That is, we must use the Sylvester’s inclusion-exclusion principle (or, Sieve formula)
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in order to consider the different intersections between each case. n ≥ 10 corresponds to the
case in which each system and each intersection in the Lemma 2 is non empty. This allows us
to have a general mathematical representation. Different representations are found for n < 10.
The exact formulas for each case in Lemma 2 and each intersection are available upon request
from the author. The corresponding probabilities of the vulnerability of Borda rule to individual
manipulation are given in Table 3. Now, let us give the same characterization for the Plurality rule.
Table 3: The probabilities of individual and collective manipulation of a self-selectivity voting rule
as a function of the number of voters n.
Individual manipulation Collective manipulation
n Borda Copeland Plurality Borda Copeland Plurality
3 0.0714 0 0 0 0 0
5 0.0516 0.0040 0 0.0159 0.0119 0
7 0.0379 0.0076 0.0215 0.0278 0.0202 0.0240
9 0.0320 0.0075 0.0195 0.0340 0.0220 0.0280
11 0.0268 0.0069 0.0133 0.0387 0.0263 0.0266
13 0.0231 0.0068 0.0189 0.0430 0.0300 0.0354
15 0.0204 0.0063 0.0178 0.0461 0.0312 0.0379
17 0.0181 0.0058 0.0136 0.0487 0.0334 0.0374
19 0.0164 0.0056 0.0159 0.0511 0.0355 0.0421
21 0.0150 0.0052 0.0152 0.0530 0.0362 0.0437
23 0.0137 0.0049 0.0124 0.0546 0.0376 0.0435
25 0.0127 0.0046 0.0135 0.0561 0.0389 0.0464
27 0.0118 0.0044 0.0131 0.0574 0.0394 0.0475
29 0.0109 0.0041 0.0111 0.0585 0.0404 0.0474
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
51 0.0063 0.0026 0.0082 0.0658 0.0454 0.0549
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
101 0.0032 0.0014 0.0044 0.0713 0.0493 0.0598
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
201 0.0016 0.0007 0.0024 0.0743 0.0514 0.0626
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
501 0.0006 0.0003 0.0010 0.0762 0.0527 0.0644
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
1001 0.0003 0.0002 0.0005 0.0769 0.0532 0.0650
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
∞ 0 0 0 0.0775 0.0536 0.0656
As in the case of Borda rule and Copeland rule, notice that the vulnerability of Plurality rule to
manipulation (without self-selectivity consideration) was widely considered in the literature. The
vulnerability of Plurality rule to individual manipulation can be found in Lepelley and Mbih [25].
Indeed, we adapt the proof to the case when individuals have to choose between voting rules in
the set X and when the rule under consideration is self-selective after manipulation. The situation
after manipulation is easy to consider in order to guarantee that the set X remains stable after
manipulation.
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Lemma 3 Consider the voting situation n˜ = (n1, n2, n3, n4, n5, n6) and the set of available
voting rules X = {Bor,Cop, P lu}. The Plurality rule is self-selective, individually manipulable
at n˜ with guaranteed stability of X if and only if the following conditions are satisfied:
(i) n5+n6 = n1+n2+1 and n5+n6 > n3+n4 and n3 ≥ 1 and [(n1+2n2−n3−2n4+n5−n6+
2 > 0 and 2n1+n2+n3−n4−n5−2n6+1 > 0) or (−n1−n2+n3+n4−n5+n6−2 > 0
and n1 − n2 + n3 + n4 − n5 − n6 > 0)]; or
(ii) n5+n6 = n3+n4+1 and n5+n6 > n1+n2 and n1 ≥ 1 and [(n1+2n2−n3−2n4+n5−n6−
2 > 0 and 2n1+n2+n3−n4−n5−2n6−1 > 0) or (−n1−n2+n3+n4−n5+n6+2 > 0
and n1 − n2 + n3 + n4 − n5 − n6 > 0)].
Proof. In order to have Plu(X, n˜) = Plu, we must have n5+n6 > n1+n2 and n5+n6 > n3+n4.
In such a situation, the only individual manipulation in favor ofBor will be from an individual with
the preferences Cop  Bor  Plu who can vote Bor  Cop  Plu. This individual (n3 ≥ 1)
can increase the Plurality score of Bor by one, and decrease the Plurality score of Cop by one,
and make Bor the Plurality winner if n5 + n6 = n1 + n2 + 1. As a consequence, the condition
n5 + n6 > n1 + n2 is not required. In addition, after manipulation the new voting situation will
be n˜ = (n1+1, n2, n3− 1, n4, n5, n6). In such a situation, Borda rule is self-selective if and only
if n1 + 2n2 − n3 − 2n4 + n5 − n6 + 2 > 0 and 2n1 + n2 + n3 − n4 − n5 − 2n6 + 1 > 0. In
addition, Copeland rule is self-selective if and only if −n1−n2+n3+n4−n5+n6− 2 > 0 and
n1−n2+n3+n4−n5−n6 > 0. This proves the necessity of (i). The same characterization can
be found in (ii) when the manipulation is in favor of Cop. 
Proposition 3 Consider the voting situation n˜ = (n1, n2, n3, n4, n5, n6) with n odd and the set
of available voting rules X = {Bor,Cop, P lu}. Consider that Plurality rule is self-selective and
that the set X contains at least one self-selective voting rule after manipulation. The probability
of vulnerability of Plurality rule to individual manipulation for n ≥ 19 is given by:
• 51296 133n
4+392n3+3606n2−21448n+48421
(n+1)(n+2)(n+3)(n+4)(n+5) for n = 1 mod 12
• 51296
(n−3)(133n3+1011n2+2511n+1377)
(n+1)(n+2)(n+3)(n+4)(n+5) for n = 3 mod 12
• 51296
(n−5)(133n3+837n2+2031n+679)
(n+1)(n+2)(n+3)(n+4)(n+5) for n = 5 mod 12
• 51296 133n
4+392n3+3606n2−21448n+48421
(n+1)(n+2)(n+3)(n+4)(n+5) for n = 7 mod 12
• 51296 133n
3+213n2−1161n−2673
(n+5)(n+4)(n+2)(n+1) for n = 9 mod 12
• 51296 133n
3+39n2−2193n−7283
(n+5)(n+4)(n+3)(n+2) for n = 11 mod 12
The proof of this proposition is similar to the propositions above. Sieve formula was also considered
in this case. The exact formulas for each case in Lemma 3 and each intersection are available upon
request from the author. Notice that different representations are found for n < 19 depending on
the domain of each case and each intersection in Lemma 3. Table 3 and Figure 1 (for n = 3, ..., 51)
display the values of the probability of individual manipulation as a function of the number of
voters n. As in the case without self-selectivity, the vulnerability to individual manipulation for
each voting rule in the set X decreases as the number n of voters increases. This probability
will tend to 0 when the number of voters is sufficiently large. In addition, for some values of n,
the Borda rule appears to be more vulnerable than the Plurality rule, which is more vulnerable
than the Copeland method. However, for n ≥ 25, the Plurality rule is more vulnerable than
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the Borda rule which remains more vulnerable than the Copeland method. For example, in the
case of n = 1001, the probability of vulnerability to individual manipulation is equal to 0.0003,
0.0002 and 0.0005 for Borda rule, Copeland rule and Plurality rule, respectively. Furthermore,
the probability of individual manipulation tends to vanish significantly when the notions of self-
selectivity and stability are imposed. The numerical results displayed in Table 3 in this paper,
Table 1 in Favardin et al. [9] and Table 1 in Gehrlein and Lepelley [11] allow us to distinguish
results for cases with and without self-selectivity consideration. For instance, for the case of
n = 51, these tables show that the probability of vulnerability of individual manipulation is equal
to 0.0382 for the Borda rule, 0.0214 for the Copeland rule and 0.0490 for the Plurality rule in the
standard case without self-selectivity. These probabilities are respectively equivalent to 0.0063,
0.0026 and 0.0082 in our new framework of self-selectivity consideration. In other words, the
probabilities in the standard case are greater than the new framework by a factor of 6.1 for the
Borda rule, 8.2 for the Copeland method and 6.0 for the Plurality rule. Finally, unlike to the
case without self-selectivity consideration, we can notice that the probability of vulnerability to
individual manipulation in our new framework is null for n = 3 for the Copeland method and for
n = 3 and n = 5 for the Plurality rule.
Figure 1: Frequencies of individual manipulation of a self-selective voting rule for n = 3, ..., 51.
4 Self-selectivity and strategic coalitional manipulation
Recall that, a coalition of voters is any non empty subset of the set containing all voters. Given a
voting situation n˜ = (n1, n2, n3, n4, n5, n6), a voting rule is said to be coalitionally manipulable at
n˜ if there exists a coalition of agents of the same type who can all benefit from a misrepresentation
of their preferences. We can characterize all voting situations at which a self-selective Copeland
rule (Borda rule, Plurality rule) is coalitionally manipulable given that the setX = {Bor,Cop, P lu}
will contain at least one self-selective rule after manipulation. As said before, the proof of each
characterization will be based on the results in the literature concerning the manipulation of each
voting rule in three-candidate election. We adapt these results for the case when individuals have
to choose between voting rules under some conditions.
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Lemma 4 Consider the voting situation n˜ = (n1, n2, n3, n4, n5, n6) and the set of available
voting rulesX = {Bor,Cop, P lu}. The Copeland rule is self-selective, coalitionally manipulable
at n˜ with guaranteed stability of X if and only if the following conditions are satisfied:
(i) −n1−n2+n3+n4−n5+n6 > 0 and n1−n2+n3+n4−n5−n6 > 0 and n1+n2−n3−n4+
n5+n6 ≥ 1 and n1+n2+n3−n4+n5−n6 ≥ 1 and [n1+n2+n3−n4+n5− 2n6 > 0
and 2n1 + 2n2 − n3 − 2n4 + 2n5 − n6 > 0]; or
(ii) −n1 − n2 + n3 + n4 − n5 + n6 > 0 and n1 − n2 + n3 + n4 − n5 − n6 > 0 and n1 + n2 −
n3 − n4 + n5 + n6 ≥ 1 and n1 + n2 + n3 − n4 + n5 − n6 ≥ 1 and [−n3 − n4 + n6 > 0
and −n1 − n2 − n5 + n6 >]0.
Proof. Notice that the first part outside the bracketed list in (i) and (ii) can be considered as a
particular case of Lemma 1 in Favardin et al. [9]. For the set X = {Bor,Cop, P lu}, in order
to have Cop(X, n˜) = Cop, the rule Cop must be the Condorcet winner. This is equivalent to
the first two inequalities in (i). In such situation, as in the case of Lemma 1, no manipulation can
occur in favor of Plu. By contrast, the voters preferring Bor can modify the majority relation
between Cop and Plu rules in order to obtain a cycle to make Bor the Copeland winner. Now,
suppose that voters with preferences Bor  Cop  Plu decide to vote for Plu in the pairwise
comparison between Cop and Plu. In addition, suppose that voters with preferences Plu 
Bor  Cop decide to vote for Bor in the pairwise comparison between Bor and Plu. As a
result, the number of individuals voting for Plu against Cop will be equal to n1 + n2 + n5 + n6
and the number of individuals voting forBor against Pluwill be equal to n1+n2+n3+n5. Then,
if n1+n2+n5+n6 > n3+n4 (i.e. n1+n2−n3−n4+n5+n6 ≥ 1) and n1+n2+n3+n5 > n4+n6
(i.e. n1 + n2 + n3 − n4 + n5 − n6 ≥ 1), then a cycle will occur and Bor will be the winner.
In addition, we need that the set has at least one self-selective voting rule when the individual
voter manipulates. This implies that Borda or Plurality need to be self-selective. With the new
voting situation n˜ = (0, n1 + n2 + n5, n3, n4, 0, n6), Borda is self-selective if and only if
n1 + n2 + n3 − n4 + n5 − 2n6 > 0 and 2n1 + 2n2 − n3 − 2n4 + 2n5 − n6 > 0. This proves
the necessity of (i). When Plurality rule is self-selective, this implies −n3 − n4 + n6 > 0 and
−n1 − n2 − n5 + n6 > 0. This proves the necessity of (ii). 
Proposition 4 Consider the voting situation n˜ = (n1, n2, n3, n4, n5, n6) with n odd and the set of
available voting rules X = {Bor,Cop, P lu}. Consider that Copeland rule is self-selective and
that the set X contains at least one self-selective voting rule after manipulation. The probability
of vulnerability of Copeland rule to coalitional manipulation for n ≥ 7 is given by:
• 12592
(n−1)(139n3+329n2+629n+919)
(n+4)(n+3)(n+2)(n+1) for n = 1 mod 6
• 12592
(n−3)(139n3+885n2+1701n+1755)
(n+5)(n+4)(n+1)(n+2) for n = 3 mod 6
• 12592 139n
4+746n3+24n2−4154n−4435
(n+5)(n+2)(n+3)(n+4) for n = 5 mod 6
Using Parameterized Barvinok’s algorithm, the number of integer points inside systems (i) and (ii)
in Lemma 4 is given by an Ehrhart polynomial. Notice that the number of integer points in the
intersection of (i) and (ii) is equal to 0. Notice also that conditions in (i) of Lemma 4 give solutions
if and only if n ≥ 5 while conditions in (ii) admit solutions if and only if n ≥ 7. The proof is
similar to the Propositions 1, 2 and 3 and is available upon request from the author.
In the following Lemma, which analyses the coalitional manipulation of the Borda rule, let
B(i, j) = B(i)−B(j) be the difference between the Borda score of alternative i ∈ X and j ∈ X
before manipulation. B(j) and B′(j) still stand for the Borda score of alternative j ∈ X before
and after manipulation, respectively.
12
Lemma 5 Consider the voting situation n˜ = (n1, n2, n3, n4, n5, n6) and the set of available
voting rules X = {Bor,Cop, P lu}. The Borda rule is self-selective, coalitionally manipulable at
n˜ with guaranteed stability of X if and only if the following conditions are satisfied:
(i) B(Bor) > B(Cop) andB(Bor) > B(Plu) andB(Cop, P lu)+2n6 ≥ n3 andB(Bor,Cop) <
n3 + n6 and B′(Cop) > B′(Bor) and B′(Cop) > B′(Plu); or
(ii) B(Bor) > B(Cop) and B(Bor) > B(Plu) and n3 > B(Cop, P lu) + 2n6 ≥ 0 and
B(Bor,Cop) < B(Cop, P lu) + 3n6 and B′(Cop) > B′(Bor) and B′(Cop) > B′(Plu);
or
(iii) B(Bor) > B(Cop) andB(Bor) > B(Plu) andB(Plu,Cop)+2n4 ≥ n5 andB(Bor, P lu) <
n4 + n5 and B′(Plu) > B′(Bor) and B′(Plu) > B′(Cop) ; or
(iv) B(Bor) > B(Cop) and B(Bor) > B(Plu) and n5 ≥ B(Plu,Cop) + 2n4 ≥ 0 and
B(Bor, P lu) < B(Plu,Cop) + 3n4 − 1 and B′(Plu) > B′(Bor) and B′(Plu) >
B′(Cop).
Proof. Conditions (i) and (ii) (respectively (iii) and (iv)) deal with the case where the Borda
rule is manipulable by a coalition of voters in favor of Copeland (respectively Plurality). Notice
that the first part (before manipulation) in (i), (ii), (iii) and (iv) can be considered as a particular
case of Lemma 4 in Favardin et al. [9]. We adapt this result to the case when individuals have
to choose between voting rules under some conditions. In addition, it is easy to check that if
the 3-type voters with preferences Cop  Bor  Plu and the 6-type voters with preferences
Plu  Cop  Bor manipulate according to the case (i) or (ii), Plurality rule can not be self-
selective after manipulation. Otherwise, if the 4-type voters and the 5-type voters manipulate
according to the case (iii) or (iv), Copeland rule can not be self-selective after manipulation. The
exact proof of this Lemma are available under request from the author. 
The reader will easily check that, for example, under condition (i), B(Cop, P lu) + 2n6 ≥ n3
and B(Bor,Cop) < n3 + n6 correspond to n1 − n2 + n3 + n4 − 2n5 + n6 ≥ 0 and n1 +
2n2 − 2n3 − 2n4 + n5 − 2n6 < 0, respectively. In addition, after the manipulation, both voters
with preferences Cop  Bor  Plu and Plu  Cop  Bor can misrepresent their sincere
preferences and vote Cop  Plu  Bor. In this case, the new voting situation will be n˜ = (n1,
n2, 0, n3 + n4 + n6, n5, 0). In this case, Copeland rule is self-selective if and only if B′(Cop) >
B′(Bor) and B′(Cop) > B′(Plu) which is equivalent to −n1 − n2 + n3 + n4 − n5 + n6 > 0
and n1 − n2 + n3 + n4 − n5 + n6 > 0. We can easily find the remaining inequalities which are
available upon request from the author. Finally, we give the characterization of vulnerability of
Plurality rule to coalitional manipulation in our new framework.
Lemma 6 Consider the voting situation n˜ = (n1, n2, n3, n4, n5, n6) and the set of available
voting rules X = {Bor,Cop, P lu}. The Plurality rule is self-selective, coalitionally manipulable
at n˜ with guaranteed stability of X if and only if the following conditions are satisfied:
(i) n5+n6 > n1+n2 and n5+n6 > n3+n4 and n1+n2+n3 > n5+n6 and [(n1+2n2+n3−2n4+
n5−n6 > 0 and 2n1+n2+2n3−n4−n5−2n6 > 0) or (−n1−n2−n3+n4−n5+n6 > 0
and n1 − n2 + n3 + n4 − n5 − n6 > 0)]; or
(ii) n5+n6 > n1+n2 and n5+n6 > n3+n4 and n1+n3+n4 > n5+n6 and [(−n1+2n2−n3−
2n4+n5−n6 > 0 and n1+n2+n3−n4−n5−2n6 > 0) or (n1−n2+n3+n4−n5+n6 > 0
and n1 − n2 + n3 + n4 − n5 − n6 > 0)].
Proof. In order to have Plu(X, n˜) = Plu, we must have n5+n6 > n1+n2 and n5+n6 > n3+n4.
In such a situation, the only coalitional manipulation in favor of Bor will be from individuals with
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the preferences Cop  Bor  Plu who can vote Bor  Cop  Plu. Those individuals can
increase the Plurality score ofBor by n3, and decrease the Plurality score of Cop by n3, and make
Bor the Plurality winner if n1+n2+n3 > n5+n6. In addition, after manipulation the new voting
situation will be n˜ = (n1 + n3, n2, 0, n4, n5, n6). In such a situation, Borda rule is self-selective
if and only if n1 + 2n2 + n3 − 2n4 + n5 − n6 > 0 and 2n1 + n2 + 2n3 − n4 − n5 − 2n6 > 0.
In addition, Copeland rule is self-selective if and only if −n1 − n2 − n3 + n4 − n5 + n6 > 0 and
n1−n2+n3+n4−n5−n6 > 0. This proves the necessity of (i). The same characterization can
be found in (ii) when the manipulation is in favor of Cop. 
Using the same approach as in the other propositions, the number of integer points inside
systems in Lemma 5 and 6 will be given by the Ehrhart polynomial. However, the complexity
of the conditions characterizing those situations at which the Borda rule and the Plurality rule are
manipulable by a coalition of voters makes impossible the derivation of a general mathematical
representation for the vulnerability of each voting rule to coalitional manipulation under some
conditions in our framework. This is due in large part to the fact that the periodicity of each
Ehrhart polynomial is very large in some cases. Fortunately, when the number of voters is given,
exact numerical values can be found for each case. Notice that, for large electorates (n tends to
∞), the corresponding probabilities are found by taking into account the coefficient of the higher
degree in each Ehrhart polynomial and the coefficient ( 1120 ) of the higher degree in ψ(n).
Table 3 and Figure 2 (for n = 3, ..., 51) display the values of the probability of coalitional
manipulation as a function of the number of voters n. As in the case without self-selectivity,
it turns out that the vulnerability to coalitional manipulation for each voting rule in the set X
increases as the number n of voters increases. When the number of voters is sufficiently large, this
probability will be equal to 0.0775, 0.0536 and 0.0656 for the Borda rule, the Copeland method
and the Plurality rule, respectively. In addition, unlike to the case of individual manipulation,
whatever the value of n, the Borda rule appears to be significantly more vulnerable than the
Plurality rule, which is more vulnerable than the Copeland method. For example, in the case of
n = 51, the probability of vulnerability to coalitional manipulation is equal to 0.0658, 0.0454 and
0.0549 for Borda rule, Copeland rule and Plurality rule, respectively. As in the case of individual
manipulation, the probability of coalitional manipulation tends to vanish significantly when the
notions of self-selectivity and stability are imposed. The numerical results displayed in Table 3
in this paper, Table 1 in Favardin et al. [9] and Table 2 in Gehrlein and Lepelley [11] allow us to
compare the two cases. For instance, for large electorates, these tables show that the probability
of vulnerability of coalitional manipulation is equal to 0.5025 for the Borda rule, 0.2500 for the
Copeland rule and 0.2917 for the Plurality rule in the standard case without self-selectivity. These
probabilities are respectively equivalent to 0.0775, 0.0536 and 0.0656 in our new framework of
self-selectivity. That is, the probabilities in the standard case are greater than the new framework
by a factor of 6.5 for the Borda rule, 4.7 for the Copeland method and 4.4 for the Plurality rule.
Finally, unlike to the case without self-selectivity consideration, we can notice that the probability
of vulnerability to individual manipulation in our new framework is null for n = 3 for the Copeland
method and the Borda rule and for n = 3 and n = 5 for the Plurality rule.
5 Conclusion and further research
The main aim of this paper was to reconsider the impact of the self-selectivity and stability
assumptions on the probability of vulnerability of each voting rule to strategic manipulation. It
seams that the probability of individual and coalitional manipulation tends to vanish significantly
when these notions are imposed to voting rules. In addition, the Borda rule appears to be more
vulnerable to individual and coalitional manipulation than the Copeland rule and the Plurality rule.
Notice that, as we have analyzed a particular case of Impartial and Anonymous Culture (IAC),
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Figure 2: Frequencies of coalitional manipulation of a self-selective voting rule for n = 3, ..., 51.
the extension of these results to Impartial Culture or other probabilistic hypothesis [21] remains
open. In addition, the extension of this paper to other voting rules remains possible. In such
situation, considering Iterative scoring rules could be interesting to study. This voting system
generalize the scoring voting rules to more than one round. That is, for the three-alternative case,
after the first voting round, the two alternatives with the highest scores go to the run-off. The
candidate who is able to defeat the other one on the basis of their pairwise comparison is then
declared as the winner. Also, one can think of studying the case of general scoring rule. Given
that, in a three-candidate election, each scoring rule can be defined by a vector (2, 1+λ, 0), looking
for the value of λwhich reduces the probability of the self-selective scoring rule λ to be vulnerable
to manipulation could be another way to follow.
Notice that the literature in self-selectivity and stability gives rise to another possibility which
could be explored: Consequentialism property [4, 19, 20]. In such a situation, voters vote on a
given set composed by alternatives which is similar to the basic framework of voting theory. In
addition, we assume that voters have intrinsic preferences over the voting rules which depend on
the results of the vote on alternatives. In other words, individuals rank the available voting rules in
accordance with what they choose from the set of alternatives. A possible route could concern the
impact of the consequentialism assumption on the probability of vulnerability of each voting rule
to individual and coalitional manipulation.
Other types of manipulation can be considered. In fact, in some situations, candidates can
have interest to exit the choice set [30]. Following the same way of studying the manipulation of
voters by using probability models, we could look at the manipulability of each voting rule when
the manipulation is based on candidates who prefer to exit the choice set. It should be noted that
the way in which we measure manipulability by counting manipulable profiles or voting situations
is not the only possible one. In fact, we could also analyse the minimal number [27] of profiles
or voting situations at which each voting rule is manipulable. Many other possibilities can also be
considered.
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